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Abstract
Background: Soon after the 2009-H1N1 virus emerged as the first influenza pandemic in 41 years, countries had
an early opportunity to test their preparedness plans, protocols and procedures, including their cooperation with
other countries in responding to the global pandemic threat. The Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance cooperation
(MBDS) comprises six countries - Cambodia, China (Yunnan and Guangxi Provinces), Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam - that formally organized themselves in 2001 to cooperate in disease
surveillance and control. The pandemic presented an opportunity to assess their responses in light of their
individual and joint planning. We conducted two surveys of the MBDS leadership from each country, early during
the pandemic and shortly after it ended.
Results: On average, participants rated their country’s pandemic response performance as good in both 2009 and
2010. Post-pandemic (2010), perceived performance quality was best for facility-based interventions (overall mean
of 4.2 on a scale from 1 = poor to 5 = excellent), followed by surveillance and information sharing (4.1), risk
communications (3.9) and disease prevention and control in communities (3.7). Performance was consistently rated
as good or excellent for use of hotlines for case reporting (2010 mean of 4.4) and of selected facility-based
interventions (each with a 2010 mean of 4.4): using hospital admission criteria, preparing or using isolation areas,
using PPE for healthcare workers and using antiviral drugs for treatment. In at least half the countries, the post-
pandemic ratings were lower than initial 2009 assessments for performance related to surveillance, facility-based
interventions and risk communications.
Conclusions: MBDS health leaders perceived their pandemic responses effective in areas previously considered
problematic. Most felt that MBDS cooperation helped drive and thus added value to their efforts. Surveillance
capacity within countries and surveillance information sharing across countries, longstanding MBDS focus areas,
were cited as particular strengths. Several areas needing further improvement are already core strategies in the
2011-2016 MBDS Action Plan. Self-organized sub-regional cooperation in disease surveillance is increasingly
recognized as an important new element in global disease prevention and control. Our findings suggest that more
research is needed to understand the characteristics of networking that will result in the best shared outcomes.
Background
As the world prepared for a pandemic because of the
emergence and spread of avian influenza A/H5N1 in the
Eastern Hemisphere beginning in late 2003, a different
pandemic influenza strain (2009-H1N1) emerged in the
Western Hemisphere in 2009 [1]. The first report of
influenza cases caused by a novel influenza A/H1N1
virus was from the United States on April 17, 2009,
describing two cases from California [2]; cases subse-
quently confirmed as due to the same virus had
appeared in Mexico beginning in mid-March [3]. Begin-
ning on April 24, 2009, the World Health Organization
(WHO) issued nearly daily, occasionally twice daily,
“situation updates” on the spread of the virus, now
known as 2009-H1N1 [4]. On June 11, the WHO situa-
tion update #47 indicated 28,774 confirmed cases in 74
countries [5]; on that date, the WHO Director-General
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reached pandemic status [6]. The pandemic continued
into 2010. On August 10, 2010, Dr. Chan announced
transition to the post-pandemic period, signalling the
end of the pandemic [7].
The 2009-H1N1 virus that emerged as the first influ-
enza pandemic in 41 years presented a less severe clini-
cal picture compared to the worst-case scenario for
which planners around the world had been preparing
themselves [8]. By late spring 2009, numerous countries
were experiencing the “first wave” of disease due to the
novel H1N1 virus, the Southern Hemisphere was about
to enter its winter influenza season, and the Northern
Hemisphere was concerned about a “second pandemic
wave” in its own upcoming fall-winter influenza season.
Thus, during spring 2009 countries had the opportunity
to assess their pandemic preparedness against the novel
influenza H1N1 virus, in preparation for expected
upcoming surges in disease [9,10].
The Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance cooperation
(MBDS) comprises six countries - Cambodia, China
(originally Yunnan and, since 2008, also Guangxi Pro-
vince), Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar,
Thailand and Vietnam - that formally organized them-
selves in 2001 to collaborate in sub-regional infectious
disease surveillance and control [11]. Soon after the first
Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the
countries’ health ministers in 2001, programming
focused on building epidemiology capacity, then evolved
in 2003 to establish a handful of “cross-border sites”
where cooperative surveillance, outbreak investigation
by Rapid Response Teams and related disease control
activities were organized [12].
In 2006-2007, MBDS leaders expanded their program-
ming to include pandemic influenza preparedness,
through a series of typically multi-sector national and
provincial level tabletop exercises in each country which
culminated in a broadly multi-sector regional tabletop
exercise in early 2007 [13]. According to the United
Nations System Influenza Coordinator’s office, this was
the world’s first multi-sector, regional pandemic influ-
enza exercise [14]. At the time of those exercises, the
world’s focus was on influenza H5N1, and many experts
expected that a pandemic would arise from Asia more
broadly and in Southeast Asia in particular [15,16].
Countries in Southeast Asia face a number of impor-
tant challenges to mounting effective responses to emer-
ging infectious diseases, including pandemics. Resource-
poor environments are associated with limited infra-
structures – both the traditional limitations in rural
areas and infrastructures that cannot keep pace with the
newer realities of urbanization, including rapid popula-
tion growth and inadequate sanitation systems [17].
Such countries are typically substantially dependent on
external support to help build their public health capa-
city and pandemic preparedness [18,19]. Their pandemic
planning must take into account limited expectations
regarding access to pharmaceutical interventions during
a pandemic, such as vaccines and antiviral agents [20].
By 2006, only some countries in Asia had engaged in
any significant planning for pandemic influenza [21].
Thus, pandemic preparedness planning at that time was
particularly compelling for MBDS, located in the epicen-
ter of expected pandemic emergence and coupled with
these additional challenges.
There is a growing recognition in the global health
community that routine disease surveillance, prevention
and control, and especially preparing for pandemics and
other large-scale public health emergencies require
regional and sub-regional planning and cooperation that
supplements and augments purely national efforts
[22,23]. Formally established regional and sub-regional
networks driven by users can help to facilitate this pro-
cess. For example, these networks have helped to facili-
tate the implementation of the International Health
Regulations [24-26]. Despite this increased recognition,
little has been written about these regional and sub-
regional networks in the literature [27]. The response to
2009-H1N1 involved activating and using many of these
networks, yet we know very little about how these net-
works function or whether or not they led to improved
outcomes.
In an effort to better understand how national and
sub-regional pandemic influenza preparedness planning
helped in the response to 2009-H1N1 in Southeast Asia,
we surveyed MBDS leaders early during the pandemic
and again shortly after it ended. The purpose was to
assess countries’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness
of their responses including both initial and overall
responses. These surveys were carried out for practical
purposes for the six MBDS member countries, to aid
their ongoing pandemic response and then reflect on
further improvements needed to strengthen their
respective public health systems and their cooperation.
The surveys thus provide lessons for these six countries,
but also information that may be valuable to other
countries and other sub-regional groups of countries
cooperating in disease surveillance and control.
Methods
Data collection
We conducted two surveys of the MBDS leadership.
The surveys were in English, the longstanding official
language of communication within MBDS. One MBDS
leader for each country, known as the “Country Coordi-
nator”, completed each survey. These leaders are fully
conversant in English. The first survey was distributed
in person during an MBDS meeting in June 2009; some
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were returned by e-mail. The second survey was e-
mailed to the MBDS Country Coordinators through the
MBDS Coordination Office, completed electronically
and then returned by e-mail. The first survey was com-
pleted between June 26 and July 10, 2009, within one
month of the official WHO declaration of the pandemic
on June 11; the second survey was completed between
December 7, 2010 and January 16, 2011, approximately
four months after official WHO declaration of the pan-
demic’s end. Information to complement the informa-
tion collected in the surveys was obtained from WHO
situation updates [4]. Because the surveys did not
involve any sensitive questions about individuals and
were purely informational in nature, they were
exempted from Institutional Review Board review. Parti-
cipants gave verbal informed consent to participate in
the research.
Survey structure and content
The surveys contained structured and semi-structured
questions and were designed to be self-administered.
The first survey and the second survey contained the
same questions with the exceptions noted below. Both
structured and semi-structured questions concentrated
on three broad areas previously designated as high prio-
rities by MBDS countries from the series of tabletop
exercises in 2006-2007: surveillance and information
sharing, disease prevention and control in health facil-
ities and the community, and risk communications.
Participants were first asked to indicate the number of
confirmed cases of 2009-H1N1 their country had experi-
enced at the time they completed the first survey. Addi-
tional structured questions required survey participants
to indicate whether or not their country undertook 32
separate activities divided across the three broad areas.
These activities were identified as needed response cap-
abilities by MBDS leaders in their regional pandemic
influenza tabletop exercise [13]. In the first survey only,
participants were asked when they first undertook each
action during the evolution of the pandemic: when cases
were in the Americas, when cases were in their region,
when cases were in their country, after the pandemic
had been declared, or not at all. In both surveys, partici-
pants were asked to rate on a 5-point Likert Scale
(where 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent) their subjective
opinion as to the effectiveness of each activity underta-
ken in their response to the pandemic. Using the same
scale they were also asked to rate how effective the
same action would have been, hypothetically, in 2006 -
before the MBDS exercises and extensive regional pan-
demic response planning. Finally, participants were
asked to use a 5-point Likert Scale (where 1 = not at all
and 5 = very much) to rate how much eleven planning-
related factors drove or contributed to the success of
their pandemic responses.
Semi-structured questions asked participants to pro-
vide narrative responses relating to the three broad
activity areas discussed above, plus a fourth area - coor-
dination within MBDS: “What went right and why?” and
“What needs improvement and what will you plan to do
to make these improvements?” Participants were also
able to provide narrative comments on improvements
needed in connection with any of the 32 specific activ-
ities, to complement their Likert scale ratings.
Data analysis and synthesis
Responses to structured questions from both surveys
were compiled and analyzed using Microsoft Excel 2007.
Assessment of when countries initiated specific activities
was based on counting the number of countries with
early initiation (value of 1 or 2) and later initiation
responses (value of 3 or 4) and then calculating the per-
centage of all responses that were initiated early. Coun-
tries that did not undertake the activity were excluded
from the calculations. Mean values of Likert scale
responses were calculated separately for each survey for
each of the 32 specific activities across countries and
each country within each of the three broad areas. Over-
all means for each of the three broad areas were calcu-
lated for both survey periods. All calculations included
only affirmative responses; items not reported or
reported as an activity not undertaken were excluded
from both numerator and denominator for each calcula-
tion. Comparisons between perceived effectiveness of
actual performance (in 2009 and again in 2010) and
hypothetical performance (had each activity been under-
taken in 2006) were calculated as the difference in
values for actual and hypothetical performance for each
activity for each survey (2009, 2010).
Responses to semi-structured questions were analyzed
using recursive abstraction. Country level responses to
each question were examined to identify common
themes. The limited amount of data allowed for com-
parisons of verbatim responses. Themes that appeared
in the responses of more than one country were selected
for additional analysis. Qualitative summaries of these
themes were developed.
Results
Initial spread of 2009-H1N1 in the region
At the time the Country Coordinators completed the
first survey, all countries had reported at least one con-
firmed case of 2009-H1N1 (Table 1). Thailand was the
first MBDS country to report confirmed H1N1 cases, on
May 13, 2009; at that time, 33 countries had reported
cases to the WHO. Thailand and Vietnam both reported
their first cases before June 11, when the pandemic was
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tries were reported after 2009-H1N1 had reached pan-
demic status, with Myanmar as the last country to
report its first case on July 1. By that date, Thailand had
already reported 1414 cases and Vietnam, 123 cases.
When did countries initiate specific response activities?
Table 2 presents details of whether or not countries had
undertaken each of the 32 specific activities at the time of
the June 2009 survey and, if so, when during the evolution
of the pandemic they initiated the activity. Nearly all coun-
tries established a case definition for 2009-H1N1 very
early, when cases first appeared in the Americas, and most
countries also instituted active case finding at hospitals
and clinics and established a hotline for reporting cases
during the early stages of the evolving pandemic. Laos and
both Yunnan and Guangxi Provinces in China each
reported initiating most of their activities quite early in the
evolution of the pandemic, when cases first appeared in
the Americas or shortly thereafter; the other MBDS coun-
tries mostly initiated activities when 2009-H1N1 had
arrived in their region or country. All countries mobilized
their Rapid Response Teams for epidemiologic investiga-
tion and response, though at different times in the evolu-
tion of the pandemic. The occurrence and timing of
communications with established MBDS cross-border
sites, with other MBDS countries, and with the MBDS
Coordinator varied across the six countries.
Cambodia, China and Myanmar each reported that
they began preparing their respective health care sys-
tems for 2009-H1N1 when cases first appeared in the
Americas, e.g., through communication with health
workers, use of specific hospital admission criteria, pre-
paration of isolation areas and of personal protective
equipment for health workers, increased attention to
hospital infection control, and preparation for medical
surge. Laos began such activities mostly when cases
were in the region or country, and Vietnam, when cases
had arrived in the country. An increased focus on PPE
for health care workers and preparations for hospital
isolation and care were the earliest activities undertaken
to prepare the health care system in most MBDS coun-
tries, at whatever stage such preparations were initiated.
Cambodia, China’s Guangxi Province, and Myanmar
each reported that they began border control measures
very early, when known cases were limited to the Ameri-
cas. Cambodia, both Chinese provinces, Laos and Myan-
mar each reported instituting containment measures, but
at different points in the evolution of the pandemic.
Cambodia restricted travel (the only MBDS country to
do so) and public gatherings and closed schools after the
pandemic had been declared. Myanmar was the only
other country to implement any such restrictions, also
closing schools once the pandemic was announced.
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar each reported that they
identified communications spokespersons early in the
evolution of the pandemic. Message consistency and
communications to avoid public panic were early priori-
ties for risk communications in Cambodia, China and
Myanmar. Communications within the MBDS commu-
nity - with other countries and with the MBDS Coordina-
tor in Bangkok - was an early priority for some countries,
but was undertaken later or not at all by others.
How did countries perceive their response performance
in 2009 and 2010?
Table 3 presents each country’s subjective ratings of its
own performance early during the pandemic and shortly
Table 1 Confirmed influenza H1N1 cases reported by MBDS countries to WHO and global situation, June-July 2009
1
Country Country Reports WHO Reports
WHO situation update on date country’s first
cases reported
1:
Date Survey
Completed
Date of first case/s in WHO
report
Total # cases in
WHO
July 1 report
Situation
update #
#o f
countries
# of cases
worldwide
Thailand June 26 May 13 1414 27 33 5728
Vietnam July 6 June 1 123 42 62 17,410
China
(Yunnan)
2
June 26 June 15 NA 49 76 35,928
China
(Guangxi)
2
June 26 NA NA NA NA NA
Laos June 26 June 19 3 51 88 44,287
Cambodia June 26 June 24 6 53 102 55,867
Myanmar July 10 July 1 1 56 112 77,201
1. WHO data come from [4]
2. WHO situation updates did not specifically address cases in China by province; an online source reported the first case from Yunnan on June 15, but similar
information was not available for Guangxi Province; NA = not applicable/not available
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mented at the time of the first survey in June 2009 were
subsequently undertaken and were rated on the second
survey. On average, participants rated their country’s
performance both early and post-pandemic as good.
Comparison of Tables 2 and 3 suggests that perfor-
mance was judged to be better for activities initiated
earlier during the evolution of the pandemic with regard
to surveillance and information sharing in China-Yun-
nan, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, and to a lesser
extent, risk communications in Cambodia and Myan-
mar. Post-pandemic, the broad area that received the
highest overall mean rating was disease prevention and
control in health care facilities (4.2), followed by
Table 2 Time at which countries first implemented specific activities
1,2, 3
ACTIVITY CAMB CYUN CGUA LAOS MYAN THAI VIET % 1 or 2
Surveillance and Information Sharing
Development/use of H1N1 case definition 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 100
Active case finding - hospitals/clinics 4 1 1 2 1 2 3 86
Active case finding - specific communities 3 3 3 2 1 2 3 43
Active case finding - ports of entry 3 1 1 1 3 1 3 57
Electronic reporting of cases 1 1 1 0 3 2 3 57
Hotline for reporting possible cases 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 71
Initial testing in district or provincial lab 0 1 1 0 0 2 3 43
Rapid Response Team mobilization 3 1 1 1 3 NR 3 50
Communication with cross-border site(s) 1 1 0 1 3 NR 2 67
Sharing information with MBDS country 1 0 0 1 3 NR 2 50
Sharing information with MBDS Coordinator 1 3 0 1 3 NR 2 50
Disease Prevention and Control - Health Care Facilities
Communications with healthcare workers 1 1 3 2 1 NR 3 67
Use of specific hospital admission criteria 1 1 0 2 1 NR 3 67
Preparation or use of isolation areas 1 1 1 2 1 NR 3 83
Use of PPE for healthcare workers 1 1 1 3 1 NR 3 67
Use of antiviral drugs for treatment 3 1 3 3 2 NR 3 33
Use of antiviral drugs for prophylaxis 3 2 3 3 3 NR 3 17
More attention to hospital infection control 1 1 1 3 4 NR 3 50
(More) preparation for medical surge 1 1 3 3 4 NR 3 33
Disease Prevention and Control - Communities
Containment measures (e.g., from WHO) 3 2 1 1 4 NR NR 50
Border control measures 1 0 1 2 1 NR NR 80
Restrictions of travel 4 0 0 0 0 0 NR 0
Restrictions of public gatherings 4 0 0 0 0 0 NR 0
Closure of any schools 4 0 0 0 4 NR NR 0
Risk Communications
Spokesperson(s) identified 1 2 3 1 1 NR 3 50
Public risk communications - targeted 1 2 3 2 3 NR 3 50
Public risk communications - everywhere 3 2 3 3 1 NR 3 33
Consistency in messages for the public 1 1 1 3 1 NR 3 67
Messages aimed to avoid public panic 1 1 1 3 1 NR 3 67
Communications with any MBDS country 1 0 0 1 3 NR 2 50
Communications with MBDS Coordinator 3 0 0 1 3 0 2 29
Communications with any external partner 3 0 0 1 1 0 2 43
1. CAMB = Cambodia; CYUN = China Yunnan-Province; CGUA = China Guangxi Province; LAOS = Laos; MYAN = Myanmar; THAI = Thailand; VIET = Vietnam.
2. 0 = Not implemented; 1 = when cases were in the Americas; 2 = when cases were in the Asia region; 3 = when cases were in their country; 4 = after
pandemic was declared.
3. NR = No response
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1, 2, 3
ACTIVITY CAMB CYUN CGUA LAOS MYAN THAI VIET MEAN
’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10
Surveillance and Information Sharing
Development/use of case definition 5 5 4 44454 N R 54454 4 . 5 4 . 3
Active case finding/hospitals & clinics 5 4 5 45434N I53454 4 . 3 4 . 1
Active case finding/communities 5 4 3 44434 N R 53434 3 . 5 4 . 1
Active case finding/ports of entry 5 4 4 4545N I N R 54444 4 . 5 4 . 2
Electronic reporting of cases 5 4 5 5 5 4 NI 3 NR 44434 4 . 4 4 . 0
Hotline for reporting possible cases 5 5 4 53434553444 3 . 9 4 . 4
Initial testing in district/provincial lab NI 4 5 4 4 4 NI NI NI 4 3 NI 2 4 3.8 4.0
Any other active surveillance activities 4 5 5 34443443254 4 . 1 3 . 6
Rapid Response Team mobilization 5 5 5 4 5 4 NR 4 4 43554 4 . 5 4 . 3
Communication w/cross-border site(s) 5 4 5 3 NI 4 NR 4 NR 4 3 NI 3 4 4.0 3.8
Sharing info w/MBDS country 5 5 NI 3 NI 4 NR 4 NR 4 3 NI 4 4 4.0 4.0
Sharing info w/MBDS Coordinator 5 5 4 4 NI 4 NR 4 NR 4 3 NI 4 4 4.0 4.2
MEAN 4.9 4.5 4.5 3.9 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.8 4.3 4.4 3.3 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1
Disease Prevention and Control - Health Care Facilities
Communications w/health workers 4 4 5 4 4 4 NR 4 NR 53444 4 . 0 4 . 1
Use hospital admission criteria 5 5 5 4 NI 4 NR 4 NR 54544 4 . 5 4 . 4
Preparation or use of isolation areas 5 4 5 5 4 4 NR 4 NR 54554 4 . 6 4 . 4
Use of PPE for health workers 5 5 5 5 4 4 NR 4 NR 44544 4 . 4 4 . 4
Use of antiviral drugs for treatment 5 5 5 4 4 4 NR 4 NR 54544 4 . 4 4 . 4
Use of antiviral drugs for prophylaxis 5 5 5 3 4 4 NR 3 3 43544 4 . 0 4 . 0
Focus on hospital infection control 4 4 5 4 5 4 NR 3 NR 53554 4 . 4 4 . 1
More preparation for medical surge 4 4 4 3 4 4 NR 3 NR 53554 4 . 0 4 . 0
MEAN 4.6 4.5 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.0 – 3.6 3.0 4.8 3.5 4.9 4.4 4.0 4.3 4.2
Disease Prevention and Control - Communities
Containment measures (from WHO) 4 4 4 4 4 4 NI 4 NR 53454 4 . 0 4 . 1
Border control measures 4 4 NI 4 4 4 NR 3 NR 53544 3 . 8 4 . 1
Restrictions of travel NR NI NI 3 NI 3 NI 2 NI NI NI NI 4 4 4.0 3.0
Restrictions of public gatherings 3 NI NI 4 NI 3 NI 2 NI 5 NI 2 4 4 3.5 3.3
Closure of any schools 4 NI NI 4 NI 4 NI NI NR 53334 3 . 3 4 . 0
MEAN 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.6 – 2.8 – 5.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.7
Risk Communications
Spokesperson(s) identified 5 5 5 4 4 4 NR 4 5 44454 4 . 7 4 . 1
Public risk communications/targeted 5 4 5 3 4 4 NR 3 3 54444 4 . 2 3 . 9
Public risk communications/broad 4 4 4 4 3 3 NR 3 4 53544 3 . 8 4 . 0
Message consistency for public 4 5 5 4 4 4 NR 3 5 54444 4 . 3 4 . 1
Messages aimed to avoid public panic NR 4 3 4 4 4 NR 4 5 53354 4 . 0 4 . 0
Communications w/MBDS country NR 5 NI 3 NI 3 NR 4 3 5 3 NI 4 4 3.3 4.0
Communications w/MBDS office 5 5 NI 4 NI 3 NR 4 4 4 NI NI 4 4 4.3 4.0
Communications w/external partner 5 5 NI 3 NI 1 NR 4 4 3 NI NI 4 4 4.3 3.3
MEAN 4.7 4.6 4.4 3.6 4.0 3.3 – 3.6 4.1 4.5 3.5 4.0 4.3 4.0 4.1 3.9
1. CAMB = Cambodia; CYUN = China Yunnan-Province; CGUA = China Guangxi Province; LAOS = Laos; MYAN = Myanmar; THAI = Thailand; VIET = Vietnam
2. Ratings of activity performance measured on a Likert Scale where 1 = very poor, 2 = poor, 3 = average, 4 = good and 5 = excellent
3. NI = not implemented; NR = no response
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nications (3.9) and disease prevention and control in
communities (3.7). More countries voluntarily chose to
not implement community-based interventions, com-
pared to activities in the other broad areas. Countries
consistently rated their performance as good or excel-
lent for use of hotlines for case reporting (2010 mean of
4.4) and of selected facility-based interventions (each
with a 2010 mean of 4.4): using hospital admission cri-
teria, preparing or using isolation areas, using PPE for
healthcare workers and using antiviral drugs for
treatment.
Cambodia’s ratings of its perceived performance overall
were higher than those for other countries, especially for
surveillance and information sharing (4.9 in 2009 and 4.5
in 2010 for Cambodia compared to 4.1 and 4.1, respec-
tively, overall), disease prevention and control in health
facilities (4.6 and 4.5 compared to 4.3 and 4.2, respec-
tively), and risk communications (4.7 and 4.6 compared
to 4.1 and 3.9, respectively). By 2010, Myanmar perceived
its performance related to disease prevention and control
activities in communities to be excellent (5.0 overall
mean), higher than all other countries. Half to two-thirds
of countries perceived the quality of their response efforts
for surveillance, facility-based interventions and risk
communications as lower overall post-pandemic, com-
pared to their initial 2009 assessments. In contrast, only
one country rated its overall performance for commu-
nity-based interventions as lower post-pandemic (2010)
compared to 2009. Myanmar and Thailand felt their per-
formance had improved, in all areas reported, by the end
of the pandemic; Vietnam also felt its performance in
surveillance and information sharing had improved, and
Cambodia also considered its community-based interven-
tions as better post-pandemic than in the early stage of
the pandemic.
How did countries perceive their actual response
performance in comparison to hypothetical performance
of the same activities in 2006?
Table 4 presents comparisons of subjective ratings of
actual performance in 2009 and 2010 to hypothetical
performance of each activity had it been undertaken in
2006. For surveillance and information sharing, Cambo-
dia and Thailand felt that their performance in 2009
was better in all areas compared to how they may have
performed if they were to have responded to a pandemic
in 2006 (mean difference of at least 1); by 2010, China-
Guangxi and Laos also perceived differences of this
magnitude in comparison with their hypothetical perfor-
mance in 2006. China-Yunnan identified an area for
improvement in the future: establishment of hotlines for
reporting possible cases (performance judged worse in
2009 than it might have been in 2006). In the area of
disease prevention and control in health facilities, Cam-
bodia and Thailand considered their 2009 performance
substantially better than it would have been in 2006; by
2010, Myanmar also considered its performance better
than it would have been in 2006. Both Yunnan and
Guangxi provinces of China and Vietnam felt that their
good to excellent performance in 2009 was no different
than it would have been in 2006. With regard to disease
prevention and control in the community, again, Cam-
bodia and Thailand considered their 2009 performance
at least one point better on average compared to 2006;
and again, by 2010 Myanmar felt its performance had
improved to this degree as well. Finally, with regard to
risk communications, Cambodia and Thailand again
initially considered their performance to have been at
least one point better on average than it would have
been in 2006, but by 2010, only Cambodia and China-
Guangxi perceived their performance for risk communi-
cations as at least one point better than in 2006.
What factors contributed to successful responses to 2009-
H1N1 in each country?
Table 5 presents subjective ratings of the contribution of
different planning-related factors, including specific
aspects of MBDS cooperation, to the success of each
country’s pandemic response performance. MBDS Coun-
try Coordinators considered pandemic preparedness
plans at national, provincial and/or local levels to have
been the most important factor contributing to the suc-
cess of their pandemic responses, with average scores of
4.7 and 4.6 in 2009 and 2010, respectively. The second
most important factor was strong political leadership
(average scores of 4.4 in both 2009 and 2010). The three
factors tied as third most important post-pandemic were
the government’s structure/management, the involve-
ment of ministries in addition to the Ministry of Health,
and having carried out pandemic preparedness exercises
- each scored 4.3 on average in the 2010 survey. The
2010 post-pandemic survey indicated that international
cooperation, including the 6-country MBDS agreement
(mean score 3.4) and action plan (3.7), communications
with other MBDS countries (3.6) and with their external
partners (3.4), and country obligations under the revised
WHO International Health Regulations (3.7) were viewed
as less important contributors to successful country
responses, in reflecting on overall responses after the
pandemic had ended. Thailand rated MBDS cooperation
as essentially irrelevant to its responses (scores of 1 for
each such item, on a scale of 1-5).
Qualitative assessment of strengths and areas for
improvement
With regard to perceived strengths in the pandemic
responses of MBDS countries, two themes stood out
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1, 2
ACTIVITY
2 CAMB CYUN CGUA LAOS MYAN THAI VIET MEAN
’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10
Surveillance and Information Sharing
Development/use of case definition 1 0 0 -1 1 2 NR 3 NR 12310 1 . 0 1 . 1
Active case finding/hospitals & clinics 3 0 1 0 2 2 NR 3 NI 11010 1 . 6 0 . 9
Active case finding/communities 3 0 0 0 2 2 NR 3 NR 11000 1 . 2 0 . 9
Active case finding/ports of entry 4 2 1 1 1 2 NR NI NR 12200 1 . 6 1 . 3
Electronic reporting of cases 1 1 0 0 1 2 NI 0 NR 1 2 NR 0 0 0.8 0.7
Hotline for reporting possible cases 1 2 -1 0 0 2 NR 3 NR 12210 0 . 6 1 . 4
Initial testing in district/provincial lab NR 3 0 -1 1 2 NI NI NI 1 1 NI 0 0 0.5 1.0
Any other active surveillance activities 3 3 0 -2 0 2 NR 1 NR 1 2 NR 1 0 1.2 0.8
Rapid Response Team mobilization 2 1 0 -1 0 3 NR 0 NR 01300 0 . 6 0 . 9
Communication w/cross-border site(s) 1 1 0 -1 NI 3 NR 0 NR 1 1 NI 0 0 0.5 0.7
Sharing info w/MBDS country 1 2 NI -1 NI 3 NR 0 NR 0 1 NI 0 0 0.7 0.7
Sharing info w/MBDS Coordinator 1 1 1 -1 NI 3 NR 0 NR 0 1 NI 0 0 0.8 0.5
MEAN 1.9 1.3 0.2 -0.6 0.9 2.3 – 1.3 – 0.8 1.4 1.7 0.3 0 0.9 0.9
Disease Prevention and Control - Health Care Facilities
Communications w/health workers 2 1 0 -1 0 1 NR 2 NR 11100 0 . 6 0 . 7
Use hospital admission criteria 1 2 0 -1 NI 1 NR 1 NR 12100 0 . 8 0 . 7
Preparation or use of isolation areas 1 2 0 0 0 0 NR 2 NR 22100 0 . 6 1 . 0
Use of PPE for health workers 2 1 0 0 0 0 NR 0 NR 1 -1 1 0 0 0.2 0.4
Use of antiviral drugs for treatment 2 2 0 -1 0 0 NR 1 NR 22100 0 . 8 0 . 7
Use of antiviral drugs for prophylaxis 1 2 0 -1 0 1 NR 0 -2 11100 0 . 0 0 . 6
Focus on hospital infection control 2 1 0 -1 0 0 NR 1 NR 21000 0 . 6 0 . 4
More preparation for medical surge 2 1 0 -1 0 1 NR 1 NR 21000 0 . 6 0 . 6
MEAN 1.6 1.5 0 -0.8 0 0.5 – 1.0 -2.0 1.5 1.1 0.8 0 0 0.5 0.6
Disease Prevention and Control - Communities
Containment measures (from WHO) 1 3 NR -1 0 0 NI 2 NR 21300 0 . 5 1 . 3
Border control measures 2 3 NI -1 0 0 NR 1 NR 22100 1 . 0 0 . 9
Restrictions of travel NR NI NI -1 NI -1 NI 0 NI NI NI NI 0 0 0.0 -0.5
Restrictions of public gatherings 2 NI NI -1 NI -1 NI 0 NI 2 NI 1 0 0 1.0 0.2
Closure of any schools 1 NI NI -1 NI 0 NI NI NR 22100 1 . 0 0 . 4
MEAN 1.5 3.0 – -1.0 0 -0.4 – 0.8 – 2.0 1.7 1.5 0 0 0.7 0.5
Risk Communications
Spokesperson(s) identified 1 2 0 -1 0 1 NR 0 0 12100 0 . 5 0 . 6
Public risk communications/targeted 1 1 0 -1 0 1 NR 2 -1 12000 0 . 3 0 . 6
Public risk communications/broad 1 1 1 -1 0 0 NR 2 0 12000 0 . 8 0 . 4
Message consistency for public 1 2 0 -1 0 0 NR 1 NR 1 2 0 NR 0 0.8 0.4
Messages aimed to avoid public panic NR 1 0 -1 0 0 NR 2 NR 11200 0 . 3 0 . 7
Communications w/MBDS country NR 1 NI -1 NI 2 NR 0 NR 0 1 NI 0 0 0.5 0.3
Communications w/MBDS office 1 1 NI -1 NI 2 NR 0 -1 0 NI NI 0 0 0.0 0.3
Communications w/external partner 1 1 NI -1 NI 2 NR 0 -1 0 NI NI 0 0 0.0 0.3
MEAN 1.0 1.3 0.2 -1.0 0.0 1.0 – 0.9 -0.6 0.6 1.7 0.6 0 0 0.4 0.5
1. CAMB = Cambodia; CYUN = China Yunnan-Province; CGUA = China Guangxi Province; LAOS = Laos; MYAN = Myanmar; THAI = Thailand; VIET = Vietnam
2. NI = not implemented; NR = no response
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Page 8 of 12based on our qualitative analysis of the comments
offered by the survey participants. The first theme
relates to surveillance and information sharing within
countries, and the second theme relates to surveillance
and information sharing across countries. Within coun-
tries, participants noted the ability of their country level
surveillance systems to exchange information efficiently.
These systems were referred to as: good (Cambodia),
reliable (China-Yunnan), critical (Myanmar), and the
most successful aspect of their country’s response (Viet-
nam). Across countries, participants noted the impor-
t a n c eo fM B D St oe n a b l et i m e l yc o o r d i n a t e dr e g i o n a l
response (Cambodia), detect disease at cross border
sites (Myanmar), and prevent the spread of the virus
(China-Guangxi).
Two key themes also emerged from comments about
areas of response that MBDS countries perceived as still
needing improvement. The first theme relates to the
desire to continue to improve communications within
countries, and the second theme relates to the desire to
continue to improve communications across MBDS
countries. Within countries, participants identified risk
communication as a major challenge. Some noted that
public health workers were “not fully trained to commu-
nicate with panicky citizens” or that more “health educa-
tion” for the public was necessary. Participants also noted
that MBDS communications across countries needed to
be improved and sustained (Cambodia), expanded and
strengthened (China-Guangxi), and that more communi-
cations in general were needed (Vietnam). One country
noted that existing communications were the “bare mini-
mum of regional collaboration” (Cambodia).
Participants also commented on plans to improve
their response in the future. They identified plans for
improvement for each of the three broad areas dis-
cussed. For example, plans to improve surveillance and
information sharing included better electronic reporting
and active case finding, sustained availability of hotline
support, joint outbreak investigation across MBDS bor-
ders and surveillance reaching out to the community
level. These health leaders hoped to improve influenza
prevention and control through building better capacity
for laboratory diagnosis; ensuring better access to vac-
cines, drugs and protective equipment; building better
local pandemic response capacity and better surge capa-
city. Needed improvements for communications among
responders and with the public include development
and use of better information and communications tech-
nologies, building capacity for public risk communica-
tions and judicious use of such communications. These
leaders also identified ways to strengthen the collabora-
tion among the MBDS countries.
Discussion
This paper presents an analysis of the subjective assess-
ment of performance at two points in time related to
MBDS countries’ responses to the 2009-H1N1 pan-
demic. Performance early during the pandemic and
post-pandemic was reported by senior health leaders in
six countries in the Mekong Basin, all of whom were
heavily involved in their countries’ pandemic response.
These countries had formally organized themselves eight
years earlier for a new type of transnational cooperation
- a sub-regional network for cooperation in disease sur-
veillance, prevention and control that reached from the
central government level out to provincial and local
cross-border operational sites. Based on the judgments
of MBDS Country Coordinators, elements of pandemic
Table 5 Subjective ratings of factors that contributed to success in pandemic response
1, 2, 3
ACTIVITY CAMB CYUN CGUA LAOS MYAN THAI VIET MEAN
’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10 ’09 ’10
National, provincial and/or local pandemic preparedness plan 55544455554554 4 . 7 4 . 6
National (provincial) political leadership 55544554552454 4 . 4 4 . 4
Preparedness structure/management in government 55543455553354 4 . 4 4 . 3
Ministries in addition to MOH 45444355554454 4 . 4 4 . 3
MBDS MOU 55432344542154 3 . 9 3 . 4
MBDS action plan 45443444442154 3 . 7 3 . 7
MBDS - other plan 4443333334 N A 154 3 . 7 3 . 1
MBDS country partner(s) 4543333534 N A 154 3 . 7 3 . 6
MBDS development partner(s) 4543333533 N A 154 3 . 7 3 . 4
TTX or other exercises (national, provincial and/or local) 45543454343554 4 . 0 4 . 3
International Health Regulations 45533452343444 3 . 9 3 . 7
1. CAMB = Cambodia; CYUN = China Yunnan-Province; CGUA = China Guangxi Province; LAOS = Laos; MYAN = Myanmar; THAI = Thailand; VIET = Vietnam.
2. MOH = Ministry of Health; MOU = Memorandum of Understanding
3. NA = not applicable
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Page 9 of 12preparedness at national and sub-regional levels identi-
fied as problematic from the 2006-2007 MBDS exercises
(many of the specific items included in the surveys
reported here) were performed relatively early and well
in the responses to 2009-H1N1 influenza, as perceived
both early during the pandemic (June 2009) and post-
pandemic (December 2010). Important contributors to
these successes included extensive pandemic influenza
planning, political leadership and government structure,
the involvement of multiple government ministries in
the pandemic response, and having carried out pan-
demic preparedness exercises including the MBDS-
sponsored exercises in 2006-2007, which were the first
exercises ever carried out in all MBDS countries except
Thailand. Cambodia and Thailand in particular, and
Myanmar to only a slightly lesser degree, felt that their
public health responses were better in 2009 and 2010
than they would have been in 2006.
Most performance indicators related to responses
within countries; the role of MBDS cooperation in con-
tributing to better pandemic preparedness in these
c o u n t r i e sc a n n o tb ea s s e s s e dd i r e c t l yf r o mo u rs u r v e y s .
However, while the quantitative scores indicate that
MBDS cooperation was not the principal driver of pan-
demic response in the individual countries (a reasonable
and legitimate perspective), performance in surveillance
and information sharing and risk communications with
other MBDS countries and with the MBDS coordinator
were generally judged as good. Moreover, the qualitative
responses also suggest that most MBDS countries value
MBDS communications and cooperation and seek to
improve them - Cambodia, China, Myanmar and Viet-
nam all commented explicitly in this regard. These find-
ings lend support to a general conclusion that MBDS
cooperation added value to the pandemic responses
across these countries. Somewhat troubling, however, is
the wide variability (across the entire 5-point range of
ratings, Table 5) in the value different countries
attached to MBDS cooperation, or at least to the specific
elements included in the surveys–the MOU, action plan,
and role of other MBDS countries.
The ultimate outcomes of interest are better system
capabilities and better health in the populations of these
countries. Findings from the surveys reported here sug-
gest that the MBDS cooperation added value to their
public health preparedness and pandemic response. Ear-
lier experiences had already included several instances
of cooperative cross-border outbreak detection and
response. The quantitative and qualitative responses in
the surveys reported here pointed to a few areas for
further attention, including laboratory capacity, risk
communications, electronic communications and local
cross-border cooperation. Several of these are already
included in the MBDS Master Plan for 2011-2016, the
core strategies of which capture some of the key cap-
abilities needed for pandemic preparedness: cross-bor-
der cooperation in surveillance and response;
coordination between animal and human health; com-
munity-based surveillance; epidemiology capability;
information and communications capability; laboratory
capability; risk communications; and policy research
[28]. It is reasonable to expect that these capabilities,
within the MBDS community and across this and other
regions, will improve both public health systems and
health outcomes by enabling more-timely and better
detection, communications, coordinated containment,
and control of the next small outbreak or the next
major pandemic.
The strengths of this paper include its focus on sub-
regional response (an emerging trend in global public
health), the use of surveys both during and after the
pandemic (to assess early progress and needs for
improvement as well as overall performance after the
hectic pace of pandemic response had subsided) and the
fact that the country surveys, though not large in num-
ber, were completed by senior health officials who were
knowledgeable and heavily involved in their country’s
pandemic response. The weaknesses of the paper can be
broken into three categories: the reliance on subjective
responses from a small number of respondents, the
inability to assess how different activities impacted out-
comes across countries, and the limited ability to assess
how and the extent to which the MBDS sub-regional
collaboration influenced their pandemic response.
The surveys reflect subjective judgments of individual
health leaders in the six MBDS countries related to
their respective country’s pandemic response early dur-
ing the pandemic and again post-pandemic. While more
objective measures, more rigorous data collection meth-
ods, and the views from a larger number of country offi-
cials may have enhanced the validity of the results, we
believe that these results had sufficient face validity for
the practical purposes intended - to guide further
improvements during the pandemic (from the 2009 sur-
vey) and provide useful insights to guide the future
actions (from the 2010 survey).
An important aspect of quality improvement is the
ability to iteratively test different interventions to see
how effective each one is and which interventions work
better than others. In this work we were not able to
directly assess whether or the extent to which specific
activities taken by each country resulted in different out-
comes. For example, we cannot directly assess whether
or not the decision of Cambodia to limit travel resulted
in better outcomes (such as slower disease spread) than
the other five countries that did not restrict travel. We
also cannot link perceived performance quality to actual
outcomes.
Moore and Dausey BMC Research Notes 2011, 4:361
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1756-0500/4/361
Page 10 of 12Our survey contained some information on how
MBDS countries collaborated together during the pan-
demic. Our ability to assess what aspects of that colla-
boration resulted in optimal responses is limited. In
a d d i t i o n ,w eh a v eo n l yal i m i t e dk n o w l e d g eo fh o w
MBDS collaborative planning prior to the pandemic
directly or indirectly impacted their national or collec-
tive sub-regional response. In a more ideal circum-
stance, a baseline survey would have been conducted
prior to all MBDS planning and would not require parti-
cipants to hypothetically conjecture how their responses
might have differed prior to their focused pandemic
planning efforts.
MBDS was founded upon a principle of coordinated
actions for the common regional good and rapid and
open communications across the MBDS community.
Despite this, there was considerable variability in the
timing of initiation of communications across MBDS
countries and with the MBDS Coordinating Office dur-
ing the 2009-2010 response. From their early experi-
ences, Country Coordinators identified some priorities
for MBDS action during 2009-2010, and they offered
further ideas for improvement post-pandemic. By the
end of the pandemic, some countries felt their perfor-
mance in one or more broad areas and for specific
activities had improved since 2009, but other countries
rated their 2010 performance as less effective than that
in 2009.
We believe it was useful to examine public health sys-
tem performance in a real situation–the 2009-H1N1
pandemic. As might be expected, the MBDS leaders
identified areas where early pandemic response was
judged to be good to excellent and other areas where
they intended to target their improvement efforts in the
near term. The 2009 survey results were presented to a
large MBDS conference in August 2009 in Kunming,
China, and MBDS leaders incorporated some of the sur-
vey’s findings into their MBDS operational plans for the
next two years. Most of these plans have not yet
received funding support, so assessment of actual
improvements since 2009 has been limited. The infor-
mation from the follow-up survey should also feed into
the planning process within countries and across the
MBDS cooperative community.
Conclusions
The public health emergency response capacity that
MBDS countries had built through training and simu-
lation exercises, national and sub-regional planning,
multi-sector engagement, and political leadership in
each country enabled what health leaders across the
MBDS community perceived as effective responses in
areas that had been identified as problematic during
the 2006-2007 MBDS tabletop exercises. Health leaders
from most but not all countries perceived that MBDS
cooperation helped drive and thus added value to their
responses to the 2009-H1N1 pandemic. Surveillance
capacity within countries and surveillance information
sharing across countries, longstanding focus areas of
MBDS programming, were cited as strengths during
the pandemic response. Several specific areas cited as
needing further improvement are already core strate-
gies in the MBDS Action Plan for 2011-2016. How-
ever, the familiarity and mutual trust that MBDS
countries have built over the decade of cooperation
did not carry over in a consistent way in terms of the
importance of MBDS network cooperation in each
country’s pandemic response. It may be worthwhile to
explore the reasons for this, as yet another avenue for
enhancing future cooperation and future collective
response to cross-border and trans-national disease
threats.
Self-organized sub-regional consortia for cooperation
in disease surveillance are increasingly recognized as a
new and important element in global disease prevention
and control, which has become very cross-border and
trans-national in nature [24]. MBDS is one of the long-
est-standing of such sub-regional cooperative groups
and has been described as an “innovative cross-border
initiative.” [17] The true value of sub-regional surveil-
lance networks like MBDS remains unclear. Countries
involved in these networks must determine the appro-
priate role for their network vis-à-vis national efforts
and how to sustain collaboration across their countries.
Our findings suggest that more research is needed to
understand the characteristics of networking that make
the most sense and that will result in the best shared
outcomes.
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